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Abstract 
The paper analyses the strategic environmental policy choices of  governments for the car 
market. We consider two countries that each have a small number of car producers who sell 
cars at home and abroad, there are cross border pollution externalities and cross border R&D 
externalities. Each government can set a fuel tax and a fuel emission standard but tariffs are 
not allowed. We show that the symmetric cooperative equilibrium will have a fuel tax lower 
than global environmental damage and the fuel standard may not be needed as instrument. 
The symmetric non-cooperative fuel tax equals the local environmental damage. Non-
cooperative governments always prefer to use a fuel tax rather than a fuel efficiency standard 
as the fuel tax allows to tax foreign profits. When car manufacturing is concentrated in only 
one country, the car importing country will opt for a higher fuel tax. The role of the fuel 
efficiency standard is enhanced when there is only a small number of producers, when there 
is a higher spill over rate and when crude oil prices are lower. The results are illustrated with 
a simple numerical model for the car market. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the failure of various global climate agreements, many governments have installed a 
unilateral, non-cooperative policy to reduce CO2 emissions. As a result, current government 
policies not only differ in the stringency of their emission reduction targets, but also in the 
mix of policy instruments used. This certainly holds for the automobile sector where we see 
governments selecting different combinations of fuel efficiency standards and fuel taxes. In 
this paper, we use a stylized model of the international car market to analyze the strategic 
policy choices of governments. 
Many papers have analyzed the efficiency and effectiveness of a single policy instrument in 
the car market, focusing on strategic car producer behavior and heterogeneous consumer 
preferences (for an overview see Parry et al., 2007).  The efficiency of different instruments 
within a policy mix has also been analyzed (Roth, 2012).  Although these studies take 
strategic supplier behavior to evaluate the choice of policy instruments into account, they do 
this in a national context and do not take into account the strategic interaction of governments 
in an international car market.  
In a market with a global pollutant, like climate, but non-cooperative environmental policies, 
governments choose their policy instruments strategically, taking the policies in other 
countries into account. Each government pays attention to environmental damage but also 
considers  the competitiveness of domestic producers and consumer surplus of its own 
citizens when choosing its policy instruments. The environment and trade literature (Sturm, 
2003) considers these interactions, but this is rarely applied to the car market. 
In this paper, we apply a model of strategic trade to a stylized international car market. We 
focus on two questions. First, we analyze what policy mix governments with a similar 
national car market will choose in a non-cooperative setting and how this differs from a 
cooperative setting. Second, we study the role of exogenous factors such as the crude oil 
price, the spillover rate of R&D, and the number of firms. Third, we study the role of 
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differences in country characteristics like environmental damage and the presence of home 
producers for the choice of policy instruments.  
First,  we find that governments have no incentive to coordinate their environmental policy 
within the car market. Governments will impose a non-cooperative policy regardless of the 
instrument combination that is chosen. Whenever they can, governments will prefer a fuel 
tax. Second, the choice of policy instruments in this non-cooperative equilibrium is 
significantly affected by the level of R&D spillovers, by the number of producers and to a 
lesser extent by the pre-tax price of oil. A higher R&D spillover rate makes government 
choose far more stringent fuel economy standards. More producers means that spontaneous 
fuel economy efforts may be too large when countries rely only on gas taxes. A higher oil 
price decreases the need for a high fuel tax.  
Third, we show that asymmetries in environmental concerns do not lead to a decrease in 
global welfare in contrast to asymmetric market characteristics between countries. When 
environmental concerns are different, the environmental leader opts for a higher fuel tax. 
When one country is mainly a car importer, it also choses a high fuel tax but it does this for 
strategic trade reasons rather than environmental damage motives.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant 
literature. In section 3, we present the model and analyze the interactions between firms and 
countries for different sets of policy instruments. In section 4, we provide a numerical 
illustration to show the different mechanisms operating in the  model. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
Policy instruments in the car market can be divided into two categories. Market based 
policies (fuel tax, fuel efficiency subsidies, etc.) aim at reducing emissions by affecting total 
car use and/or fleet composition. On the other hand, technology-based policies (emission 
standards, R&D subsidies, etc.) reduce emissions through fuel economy improvements only. 
In the literature, these instruments are mostly approached in a one country-one government 
world. A first approach only considers one instrument and determines its optimal level (see 
Parry and Small (2005) for fuel taxes, Fischer et al. (2007) for emission standards). A second 
approach is to compare the cost effectiveness of different instruments to reach a given 
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emission reduction target (Goulder and Parry, 2008). Focusing on the comparison between 
gasoline taxes and emissions standards
3
, most studies show that the latter are far less cost-
effective at reducing CO2 emissions. Fuel taxes improve welfare by simultaneously 
increasing fuel economy and decreasing vehicle use. An emission standard only increases 
fuel economy which lowers fuel costs of driving and thus stimulates vehicle use. Of course, if 
one assumes that consumers do not correctly value fuel economy, this may tilt the choice 
back to fuel standards, however, the empirical evidence for this myopic behavior is rather 
weak (Allcott & Greenstone, 2012). Even when one takes on misperceptions by consumers, 
the ranking of instruments is not necessarily very different (Parry, Evans, Oates, 2014). 
Most papers on instrument comparison in the car market rely on econometrically estimated 
market models with strategic behavior of car producers and idiosyncratic consumer 
preferences. Following Berry et al. (1995), the car market is then characterized as market 
with differentiated Bertrand-competition between producers on a given national market. 
Government policy is taken as given. In this paper, we make abstraction of heterogeneity of  
producers and consumers and focus on the strategic game between governments. We allow 
for imperfect competition within the car market by considering a symmetric oligopoly with 
one homogeneous car type that can only differ in fuel efficiency. This way, the model is 
simplified but still accounts for strategic producer behavior. 
To understand governments’ strategic behavior in an open economy, we rely on the standard 
models of the international trade and environmental policy literature
4
. One of the first authors 
to discuss such strategic policy setting in a context of imperfect competition was Barrett 
(1994). He analyzes how different forms of market imperfections influence the setting of 
environmental policy. Governments may weaken their environmental standards to improve 
competitiveness, which could lead to a ‘race to the bottom, as feared by environmentalists. In 
his paper, Barrett only considers the problem of local pollution. Local pollution is pollution 
that only damages the country of emission. Global pollution in the form of environmental 
spillovers has been added in subsequent papers (see for example Ulph (1996) and Sturm and 
Ulph (2002)). One paper that is of particular interest for our research is Ulph and Ulph (2007) 
who analyze how a mix of instruments can be used to correct for environmental damage in a 
                                                 
3 One can consult Kleit (2004), Austin and Dinan (2005), West and Williams (2005) and Jacobson (2013).  A complete 
overview is given by Anderson et al. (2011) who survey the literature. 
4 For an overview, see Sturm(2003). 
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non-cooperative context. They analyze the introduction of a tax on emissions combined with 
a subsidy for R&D. They find that both instruments are affected by strategic behavior and 
R&D spillovers. Strategic considerations on the output market drive the government to set its 
environmental tax too low and its R&D subsidy too high. The authors do not discuss the net 
effects on welfare of the different policy interactions at work. In the next section, we propose 
a model close to Ulph and Ulph (2007) to demonstrate how policy choice in the car market 
can be affected by strategic considerations of governments.  Compared to their paper, we add 
international R&D spillovers and focus on environmental pollution through consumption 
instead of production. We illustrate the theoretical results for the car market with a numerical 
example. 
Three additional papers are closely related to our research. In Barla and Proost (2012), the 
efficiency of energy taxes and emission standards is compared in a non-cooperative world. 
The authors show that the lack of coordination across countries combined with international 
environmental spillovers and knowledge spillovers favor the introduction of emission 
standards over energy taxes. The main reason is that reducing emissions by standards 
produces comparatively more knowledge spillovers and therefore a larger total effect. 
Compared to Barla and Proost, we add imperfect competition in the car market and analyze  
combinations of different instruments. Another recent paper (Hattori, 2013) compares 
quantity and price regulations in a non-cooperative world with an international oligopoly. 
Similar to Ulph and Ulph (2007), this paper focuses on CO2 emissions from the production of 
two firms, each located in a different country, but also adds welfare analysis of using the two 
instruments in a cooperative and non-cooperative model. In comparison with Hattori (2013), 
we focus on CO2 emissions from consumption. We also allow for a policy mix and check for 
the equilibrium of instrument choice in non-cooperative settings. Finally there is the study of 
tariffs and environmental taxes in the presence of R&D by Tsai,Tu & Chiou (2014). They 
also use an Ulph and Ulph type of model but focus on the interrelations between an 
environmental tax and a tariff, while we focus on the combination of environmental tax and a 
standard.  
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3. Theoretical model 
3.1. General setup 
In the formal model we stick to the symmetric case with two countries and n car producers. 
Each country has half of the car producers. Each producer makes only one type of car which 
is sold in both countries. Cars only differ in their fuel efficiency. Governments can impose a 
fuel tax t on cars used within their country or they can determine a minimum level of fuel 
economy  ̅  for all cars sold and used in their country. As we impose that only one type of car 
is sold by each car company, the emission standard holds for both countries. The model 
structure is shown in Figure 1. 
  
 
The model is solved by a three-stage game. In the first stage, governments choose their policy 
instruments. They can choose to use only one instrument (tax or standard) or decide to use 
both instruments. Each government chooses the policy instruments that maximize the sum of 
home consumer surplus, fuel tax revenues and home firms’ profits minus the damage of 
pollution. Governments can either cooperate or not cooperate. In the case of cooperative 
governments, instruments are chosen as to maximize joint welfare. In the non-cooperative 
Figure 1. Model structure   
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case, each government optimizes domestic welfare for given policy levels of the other 
country. An overview of the different scenarios is given in Table 1.  
Once governments have chosen their policy, car companies decide non-cooperatively on the 
level of fuel economy (x) in the second stage. They can choose to invest more in fuel 
economy than required by any government.  In the third stage, the output (y) of the firms is 
determined by Cournot competition between the firms in each of the two markets. We solve 
the model using backward induction. We determine first the outcome of the third stage after 
which we analyze the choice of fuel efficiency by the car manufacturers. Finally, we consider 
the policy choice by each government, given the strategic decisions of car producers in stage 
2 and 3. We assume two fully symmetric countries: demand and cost parameters are equal in 
both countries and for all car producers. The symmetry allows us to simplify the analytical 
model and the interpretation of the results. In section 4, we discuss  the effect of different 
types of asymmetries numerically.  
Table 1. Different policy options for governments. 
 Cooperative Equilibrium Non-Cooperative Equilibrium 
Both Instruments    
    ̅ 
∑  
 
        ̅ 
                 ̅  
Fuel Tax    
  
∑  
 
      
                
Emission Standard    
 ̅  
∑  
 
     ̅ 
              ̅  
Note:      ̅are respectively the tax and emission standard of country i,  is the welfare of country i. 
3.2. Strategic decisions in the car market 
In this section we set out the assumptions and definitions for the model. Next, we analyze the 
strategic decisions of car producers on output in the car market (stage three) and  investments 
in fuel economy (stage two).  
3.2.1. Assumptions and definitions 
In each country, consumers buy cars for a fixed mileage. Although consumers generally have 
heterogeneous preferences over different car characteristics (Berry et al., 1995), we can 
simplify the model by using a homogenous car type without affecting the insights of the 
model. The only criterion for selecting a car is then the total user price of the car which 
consists of the purchase price and the discounted value of total expenditures on fuel. The total 
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sales of cars in country i by company j is given by                  .  For each country, we 
define the inverse demand function for cars.  
        [∑   
 
]                      (3.1) 
Each government can set a tax on fuel, expressed in Euro/litre. The price of fuel for the 
consumer consists of the world market price F plus the tax    paid to the government. 
Normalizing fuel efficiency (in litre/km)     to 1, the total fuel cost of a car              used in 
country i and produced by company j equals the total mileage g times the tax rate    plus the 
pre-tax price F: 
     (     )             (3.2) 
As the initial fuel efficiency of a car is normalized to 1, a company can improve this fuel 
efficiency level by extra efforts     [   ] . Since a firm sells the same car on both markets, 
it selects only one level of fuel economy. Fuel efficiency of one producer has a positive effect 
on the fuel efficiency of the cars of the other producers. The fuel economy of each car 
produced by company j equals: 
            ∑  
 
                                      (3.3) 
where   [   ] is the spillover parameter for the R&D efforts. 
By assumption, the cost of producing a more fuel efficient car does not depend on the 
production volume. We do not focus on fuel economy improvements as a result of a trade off 
with other car characteristics but look for radical improvements in fuel economy that are 
driven by R&D of the car producers. We assume that the cost for research and development 
does not depend on company size or total sales but that it is increasing and convex in the 
amount of realized fuel economy per vehicle and equals    
 . 
For a local pollutant, the damage cost for country i is a function of the emissions generated by 
the cars sold in that country:    ∑         . For a global pollutant, the damage definition for 
each country becomes  
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   (∑  
 
 (        ))            (3.4) 
where   is a parameter denoting the amount of pollution that spills over from the other 
country. For our theoretical analysis, we consider only global pollution (    , which means 
that pollution not only affects the country of origin but every country within the model. 
3.2.2. Third stage: The Cournot equilibrium 
Assume that the government has decided on an environmental policy and that all firms have 
already chosen their level of fuel efficiency efforts (x). As a consequence, the cost functions 
for both companies are fixed. In each market, a firm then determines its output by 
maximizing profits, taking the output of the competitors as given. We analyze the optimal 
output for one market only. We can solve for the other market in a similar way. The 
maximization problem of firm j is (using 3.1): 
    
   
    [  (∑    
 
   
)     ]                          (3.5) 
The variable production costs of a car are constant and similar for all companies and equal to 
d  By solving the first order conditions for                     we can derive the Cournot 
equilibrium
5
. Optimal Cournot output is:  
     
  ∑             
      
                            (3.6) 
Expression (3.6) demonstrates the role of fuel economy for the car manufacturers: a decrease 
in the fuel cost     of its own car or an increase in the fuel cost of a competitors’ car increases  
the output level of the firm and thus increases gross profits. 
3.2.3. Second Stage: Optimal fuel economy  
Each car company decides on the optimal level of fuel economy. This decision is influenced 
by government policy in the first stage. If governments only use taxes, car producers choose 
their fuel economy level by optimizing profits for a given fuel economy level of other firms. 
                                                 
5 The derivation can be found in appendix A. 
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If governments impose a minimum fuel economy level, each car producer can still choose to 
invest more in fuel economy than is required by governments. The objective function of the 
firm is then maximized with respect to the fuel efficiency efforts, as long as this effort is 
higher than imposed by any of the governments.
6
 For firm j, the objective function is  
      
  ∑    
 
 
     
             ̅         (3.7) 
This results from using the properties of a Cournot equilibrium (3.5) and (3.6):  we see that 
every producer receives a  profit mark-up      on each car that is sold. We can thus write the 
producer  profits in each market as in (3.7) solely in function of its total car sales. The cost of 
each producer depends on the choice of     The choice of fuel economy by producer j  affects 
its sales directly via its own fuel cost              but also indirectly via knowledge 
spillovers (at rate δ) on the fuel cost of its competitors. Trading off output effects and the cost 
of fuel efficiency efforts    
 . , we find the condition for the equilibrium fuel efficiency 
efforts of each firm  
7
 
 ∑ (
        
   
)             
 
 
     (3.8) 
This expression shows that the fuel efficiency efforts of a producer are influenced by 
domestic and foreign tax rates in exactly the same way. Any increase in taxation directly 
stimulates fuel efficiency efforts by all producers.
8
 
 
  
   
                    
3.3. The policy choices of governments 
When a government chooses its environmental policy, it takes the strategic response of the 
car producers, both on the level of fuel economy as well as on output, into account. In this 
section, we analyze the six different policy scenarios that we discussed in section 3.1. First of 
                                                 
6 We only analyze the case in which car producers decide to sell cars in both countries. As we impose complete model 
symmetry, this is the only relevant case: in equilibrium, any emission standard set by government will be equal for all 
governments. As long as total profits are positive for each firm, they will thus sell cars in both countries. 
7 The complete derivation can be found in appendix B. 
8 This result holds only for completely symmetric countries and for an interior solution of the model in which every producer 
has a positive output level (                ]   ]  
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all, governments decide whether they choose policy instruments cooperatively or not. 
Second, they select a fuel economy standard, a tax on fuel or a combination of these two 
instruments. 
3.3.1. Coordinated policies 
We first assume that governments cooperate when selecting policies. Governments jointly 
maximize the total welfare that is generated by car usage over the two countries. The welfare 
function is given by (3.9) and includes the total consumer surplus in both countries, the 
profits of all firms over the two markets and the tax income for each government minus the 
environmental damage that affects both countries.  
 
    [∑
 
 
(∑          
 
)
 
 
]  [∑    
        
   
 ∑   
 
 
]
 [∑   (∑                  
 
)
 
]   [   {∑    (  )          
   
}] 
                        {
                           
        
   
 
(3.9) 
Case 1: Combining an emission standard and fuel tax 
In our model, we address multiple market failures. Governments have to correct for both 
environmental damage, R&D spillovers and monopolistic behavior of car producers. We 
expect thus that governments need a mix of policy instruments to obtain the optimal outcome. 
We consider the fuel tax to control for total market output and an emission standard that 
optimizes the investments of car producers in fuel economy. We maximize (3.9) with respect 
to fuel tax    and emission standard  ̅ . As a result of model symmetry, the equilibrium 
output levels, fuel economy and taxes are equal among countries and producers (      
  ̅   ̅                  ). We can therefore write  the optimal policy mix as: 
  
   
  
          (3.10) 
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    ̅ 
 
(3.11) 
Equation (3.10) shows that the optimal fuel tax is lower than marginal damage (2D’): the 
monopoly margin of the firms already decreases total output. Therefore, the fuel tax is 
decreased with this margin. The optimal level of fuel economy (3.11) sets marginal gains of 
fuel economy equal to marginal costs and is driven by two forces. First, increasing fuel 
economy results in extra market surplus, which is represented by the first term on the left 
hand side. This extra surplus is created by efficiency gains from fuel economy that are not 
compensated by a higher cost per vehicle, as the cost of R&D does not depend on the output 
level. Second, the remaining damage that is not corrected by the fuel tax increases the 
incentives to invest in fuel economy.  If the number of car producers (n) increases, we see 
that the fuel tax increases due to lower profit margins, while the optimal emission standard 
becomes less stringent as the fixed costs of R&D, aggregated over all companies, will 
increase. For increasing R&D spillovers δ, the emission standard increases as investments in 
fuel economy become more efficient. This increase in fuel economy lowers the need to 
reduce output on the car market, which means a lower optimal fuel tax. 
The equilibrium defined by (3.10) and (3.11) imposes a minimum level of fuel economy for 
car producers and a fuel tax that is optimal given that producers comply to this standard. 
However, car producers can also choose a fuel economy level that  is more stringent than the 
standard. This means that the solution is only optimal as long as the emissions standard set by 
governments is binding. If we compare the choice of producers (3.8) with the emission 
standard of governments (3.11), we see that, in the absence of spillovers in R&D, the 
government standard is binding as long as: 
 
     
   
       
  
 
(  
 
      
)    (3.12) 
For a high number of car producers, governments prefer a lower fuel economy effort than 
producers because R&D costs are fixed costs per firm. This means that for a high number of 
car producers, it might be sufficient to set a fuel tax without imposing a minimum effort in 
fuel economy. Car companies are always driven to invest in R&D for cleaner cars as long as 
there are no R&D spillovers.  This results in a more competitive car at a fixed cost. Whenever 
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R&D spillovers are introduced in (3.12), firms tend to make less efforts and the government 
standard is more likely to determine the final fuel economy level via the emissions standard.  
We summarize this result in proposition 1:  
PROP 1 In the international cooperative symmetric  solution, the fuel tax rate is set 
below the global environmental marginal damage to compensate for the monopolistic 
margins. Minimum fuel efficiency standards are not needed when there are many firms 
and the R&D spill over rate is low as firms use  fuel efficiency as strategic competition 
instrument.  
 
Case 2: Only fuel taxes 
Governments cooperatively maximize the same welfare function but can only use a fuel tax 
as instrument. Car producers take the decision on fuel economy as no standard is imposed. 
We derive the first order condition:  
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 ] 
 
(3.13) 
The incentives for a government are not different from the previous case where a fuel 
efficiency standard and gasoline tax were combined. The fuel tax differs from the marginal 
damage for two reasons. First, as before, the monopoly margin reduces the optimal fuel tax, 
which is represented by the second term on the left hand side of (3.13). Second, the fuel tax 
provides an incentive for firms to set the right level of fuel economy shown in the first term 
on the LHS of (3.13). With only a small number of firms and high R&D spillovers, the tax 
will be higher to ensure enough fuel economy efforts. With more car producers or a higher 
crude oil price, the tax should be lowered to decrease the overinvestment in fuel economy of 
car producers. As we modelled fuel economy efforts to be a fixed cost per firm, large fuel 
economy efforts become less efficient when there are many firms.  
Case 3: Only emission standards 
Governments can be reluctant to set any (higher) fuel tax as this increases the cost of driving 
for voters. If governments decide to use only emission standards to correct for global 
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pollution, we can derive the objective function with respect to  ̅  and get the same first order 
condition as  (3.11), where taxes are now set equal to zero. 
 
                
   
          (  
 
      
)               ̅  (3.14) 
Compared to (3.11), the absence of the fuel tax has three effects. First, the output y of each 
firm increases as consumers no longer have to pay the fuel tax. This makes governments set a 
higher emission standard (second term of (3.14)). Second, the extra market surplus that is 
generated by fuel economy through R&D is smaller as this is now only generated by the 
world price of fuel F (first term of (3.14)), this relaxes the optimal emission standard.  
The net effect on the emission standard is thus unclear: the emission standard can be lower or 
higher than when it is combined with an emission tax. In both cases, however, the emission 
standard is only binding as long as car producers are not willing to invest more in fuel 
economy. Without fuel taxes and in the absence of R&D spillovers, the standard is binding as 
long as : 
 
     
   
        (  
 
      
)     (3.15) 
In a cooperative equilibrium we see that a high concentration of car producers eliminates the 
need to set an emission standard. The competition among producers already drives the firms 
to invest (too) heavily in fuel economy.  
The comparison between a policy mix and a policy in which only an emission standard or 
only a fuel tax is available is difficult as we cannot determine whether there is a need for a 
binding fuel emission standard. We will explore this issue further in the numerical illustration 
in section 4. 
3.3.2. Non-coordinated policies 
Governments are often not coordinating their policy instruments. In this section we analyze 
the policy choices when governments only care about the welfare of their own consumers and 
the surplus of the domestic car producers. They take the policy choices of the other 
governments as given. To keep the analytics tractable, we analyze only the cases in which the 
two governments use the same instruments. In the numerical illustration we will explore the 
case where governments use different instruments. Moreover, when we assume that the 
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profits of the car producers are equally divided over the two countries, this results in 
symmetric outcomes so that the equilibrium conditions can be generalized as before (      
                      ). The non-cooperative choice of instruments by a government 
maximizes: 
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(3.16) 
Compared to (3.9), the welfare function of a non-cooperative country (3.16) consists only of 
local consumer surplus (first term), half of the firm profits (second and third term) and 
domestic tax income (fourth term) minus the damage to the own country. We next analyse the 
three possible combinations of instruments. 
Case 1: Combining an emission standard and fuel tax 
If we maximize (3.16) with respect to the fuel tax and emission standard, taking the 
instruments of the other governments as given, we have first order conditions (3.17) and 
(3.18) that determine the equilibrium. 
       (3.17) 
 
                
   
                 (  
 
      
)           
     
 
(3.18) 
There are two main differences in the policy behavior of cooperative and non-cooperative 
governments. First of all, the fuel tax in the cooperative equilibrium is now set below global 
marginal damage (2D’) and only takes the damage to local consumers D’ into account. This 
result is specific to our model formulation. Besides, the effect on environmental damage, the 
setting of taxes takes on board two other effects. First, as governments only care about 
domestic profits, the incentive of a government to increase company profits by setting a 
lower tax is reduced because the government is interested in taxing away the profits of the 
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foreign producer. Second, lower fuel taxes also allow to correct the too-low duopoly output. 
Due to symmetry, these two effects cancel out and make the optimal tax simply equal to the 
local damage.  
While the fuel tax is affected by non-cooperative behavior, the incentives for the emissions 
standard are exactly the same as in the cooperative case. As a result, conditions (3.11) and 
(3.18) are the same. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, the marginal gains of fuel economy 
are exactly half of the global marginal gains. Also, the costs are divided equally over the two 
countries. Therefore, the same condition can be used to determine the emission standard set 
by the governments. We summarize our results so far in proposition 2: 
PROP 2 In a non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium, countries set the fuel tax equal to 
the local rather than the global environmental damage because the motive to tax foreign 
profits is compensated by the motive to correct the monopolistic margins. The fuel 
efficiency standard is only used when the number of firms is small and the R&D spill 
over rate is low.  
Symmetric first order conditions do not result in the same final choice of fuel economy, as 
this also depends on the level of the fuel tax set by the government. In addition, the condition 
for a binding emission standard is also affected by the choice of the fuel tax.  
In comparison with (3.15), expression  (3.19) leads to a lower fuel tax as only local marginal 
damage is taken into account. This means that the emission standard imposed in the non-
cooperative equilibrium will be more easily non-binding compared to the cooperative 
equilibrium. 
 
     
   
            (  
 
      
)     (3.19) 
 
Case 2: Only fuel taxes 
Maximizing (3.16) taking into account the strategic fuel economy decisions of car producers 
results in equilibrium condition (3.20). As  in case 1, the tax serves to capture part of the 
foreign producer surplus, so that the non-cooperative tax increases rather than decreases with 
the profit margin of the producer. The tax is different from marginal damage for two more 
reasons. First, the government again tries to optimize the fuel economy of the cars produced 
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by domestic companies via the tax rather than the fuel efficiency standard. The first term of 
the LHS of (3.20) incorporates the strategic fuel economy decision of car producers as in 
(3.8). Second, the government can influence the foreign emissions that cause domestic 
damage, by setting a stricter standard, which is represented by the second term on the LHS of 
(3.20). Compared to (3.17), the effect of the tax on the fuel economy choice of car producers 
will determine whether the tax is higher or lower than the marginal damage to the local 
consumers. If car producers overinvest in fuel economy (in case of low spillovers, high 
market concentration and high fuel prices), governments will tend to decrease the tax to 
lower the fuel economy efforts.  In the opposite case, governments will set a higher tax to 
encourage more fuel economy. 
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(3.20) 
Case 3:Emission standards only 
The last case, in which only an emission standard is imposed, is the only case in which 
governments have no strategic incentive to deviate from the cooperative outcome in (3.14). 
This means that strategic behavior never leads to welfare losses if governments can only set 
emission standards. However, this does not automatically imply that, in a non-cooperative 
setting, an emission standard outperforms other instrument choices in global welfare terms. 
First, we need the emission standard to be binding, which means that (3.15) still needs to hold 
in equilibrium. This will only be the case for a small number of producers and a lower R&D 
spillover rate. Second, the absence of a fuel tax will result in very high output when there are 
many car producers.  
3.3.3. Optimal policy choices 
Both for the cooperative and for the non-cooperative symmetric case, we have analysed the 
preferred mix of policy instruments.  However, we are mainly interested in the relative 
efficiency of each policy.  
In the cooperative and in the non-cooperative equilibrium, the relative efficiency of fuel 
taxes, emission standards or a combination of the two instruments depends on the degree of 
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market competition, the pre-tax price of gas and the degree of technology spillovers. As long 
as in equilibrium the fuel tax is positive and the emission standard is binding, it is always best  
to use both instruments: 
 The emission standard enforces the car producers to set the level of fuel economy that 
trades off the societal benefits and costs of investments in R&D; the optimal level of fuel 
economy for society will differ from the car producers’ choice as a result of market 
competition (too high fuel efficiency efforts in the case of many firms) and R&D 
spillovers (insufficient fuel efficiency efforts in case of large spillovers between firms). 
 The remaining environmental damage can be taxed as long as the profit margins of car 
producers do not already correct for this remaining damage. However, non-cooperative 
behavior significantly affects the tax instrument, as it provides the government with an 
incentive to have too low taxes as it considers only local external effects but also with an 
incentive for too high taxes as it also wants to tax the profits of foreign car producers. 
In case of a non-binding emission standard, the government will use the tax to correct for the 
remaining environmental damage, but will be careful in raising the tax as it also wants to 
limit the incentives for fuel efficiency efforts as they are already excessive. As a result, the 
tax will be lower compared to the two-instrument case, as the fuel economy choice of car 
producers (which increases with the fuel tax) is inefficiently high compared to the optimal 
emission standard. 
To assess the cooperation incentives of the governments, the implicit definition of the 
equilibrium is insufficient. We need to analyze the implications of deviating from each 
equilibrium to understand the dominant strategy of both governments. We can solve the 
explicit solution in each case for the fuel tax, emission standard and welfare in both countries. 
The analytical results are given in Appendix C and formulated in proposition 3.3. We 
summarize our findings in the following proposition: 
PROP 3 Every individual government has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative 
equilibrium: each government prefers to impose a non-cooperative fuel tax, regardless 
of any emission standard that is imposed. When environmental damage has a global 
character and is large, this leads to too low fuel taxes. When environmental damages are 
small, this leads to too high fuel taxes.  
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In the symmetric equilibrium, it is thus very unlikely that governments set a cooperative 
policy, as the dominant strategy is to set a different fuel tax. However, it is difficult to predict 
the relative importance of the different incentives as they are highly dependent on 
characteristics such as the degree of market competition, the pre-tax price of gas and 
technology spillovers. In the next section, we use a numerical illustration to better understand 
the interplay between the different considerations. 
4. A numerical illustration for the car market  
The analytical approach shows that the relative efficiency of instruments depends on the 
model parameters. In this section, we use a small numerical simulation model to better 
understand the different interactions. We first calibrate a benchmark case to demonstrate the 
results of the analytical section. We analyze the different policy options for each government 
and compare the total welfare for cooperative and non-cooperative policies. Second, we 
analyze the role of different model parameters as there are market competition, R&D 
spillovers and the pre-tax gas price in the model. We show their impact on both instrument 
efficiency and incentives for non-cooperative policies. In a final section, we redirect our 
attention towards asymmetric cases. We analyze how differences in environmental damage 
and the market share of the domestic car industry can lead to an equilibrium with asymmetric 
policy decisions. 
4.1. The benchmark equilibrium 
4.1.1. Calibrating the parameters 
We divide the world into two countries. Relying on general sales statistics
9
, we see that in 
most countries, the top eight car manufacturers represent approximately 80% of total car 
sales. For our benchmark, we thus assume that there are eight producers, equally divided over 
the two countries. For the calibration, we assume that there are no spill overs in R&D and 
that the four plus four car producers sell their car type in both markets. We first construct an 
equilibrium in which no fuel taxes are levied. The incentives for fuel efficiency are driven by 
                                                 
9 Sales statistics retrieved from the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA). 
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the pre-tax gas price only. Next, we analyze the optimal fuel tax level in both the cooperative 
and non-cooperative equilibrium.  
An overview of all demand and cost parameters for this numerical example is given in Table 
2. We assume the demand for car travel to be linear and symmetric in both countries:  The 
inverse demand function is given by p                . Each car drives 20,000 km each 
year during 10 years. The producer price of fuel is fixed at 0.5 €/litre. 
The production cost of a car is constant and equal to 12,000 €. All producers sell the same 
type of car. Cars only differ by their fuel economy. Every car company produces initially a 
car with a fuel efficiency of 10 l/100km. Producers can improve the fuel efficiency at a cost 
of 400 x² where x is the percentage of fuel consumption reduction per km. For the benchmark 
case, we do not consider any R&D spillovers to other producers. 
According to An and Fauer (2004), for each litre of gasoline driven, a car produces on 
average 2,32kg of CO2. We assume a world social cost of carbon of 50€/ton
10
. Combining 
these data, each litre of gasoline has a global pollution damage of 0.12 €. In addition, we also 
take into account local pollution. Using data from a Belgian study (Delhaye et al., 2010), 
other external environmental costs, excluding CO2 emissions, are estimated at 0.25 €/litre. 
We neglect congestion and traffic safety costs
11
. 
Table 2. Demand and cost parameters 
Demand for cars P=90 000 - 0.01 Q 
Traveled distance 200 000 km/car 
Fuel production cost 0.5 €/l 
    
Initial fuel efficiency 10l/ 100km 
Production costs 12 000 € 
R&D costs (bln €) 400 x² 
    
Local external costs 0.25 €/l 
Costs of climate change 0.12€/l 
4.1.2. Benchmark results 
Table 3 provides the results of the benchmark case. In the equilibrium without government 
policy we see that 6.1 million cars will be sold annually
12
 in each country. Consumers pay 
                                                 
10 A survey on the social cost of carbon can be found in Tol (2008). 
11 They can be addressed by other instruments.  
12 Which corresponds to US sales in 2011, as retrieved from OICA 
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29,255 € for driving, which consists of a fuel cost of 9,328€ over the lifetime of the vehicle 
and a car price of 19,630 €. We find a point price elasticity for car travel equal to -0.47 and a 
price mark-up of each producer of approximately 39%
13
. Any investment in fuel efficiency is 
driven by the fuel price. Every producer invests 3% of its annual sales into R&D
14
, which 
results in a fuel economy of only 3.20%.  
If we introduce government policy, welfare is highest in the cooperative case if governments 
only use a fuel tax, without imposing an emission standard. The reason is that the large 
numbers of producers, combined with the absence of spill overs, already generates too high 
fuel efficiency investments. The equilibrium conditions that determine the optimal 
combination of an emission standard and a fuel tax (3.10 and 3.11), result in an emission 
standard that is not binding for car producers. This generates optimal taxes that are lower than 
the global marginal damage.  
If no taxes can be used, the emission standard becomes binding and generates more 
investments in fuel economy in comparison with the case of no government policy. However, 
the standard is much less efficient compared to the fuel tax as it increases total car sales, 
which has a negative effect on total pollution. In general, differences in welfare are rather 
limited
15
. Compared to a fuel tax, an emission standard generates a yearly loss of respectively 
420 mln €. This is illustrated in the first two columns of Table 3.  
If governments determine their policy non-cooperatively, we obtain the results in the last 
three columns of Table 3. We see that the emission standard is not affected by strategic 
government behavior (Prop.2). However, if they can only use the fuel tax, the fuel tax is 
much higher than in the cooperative case because the global environmental damage is 
relatively small. In the cooperative case, there was a significant incentive to set a tax below 
the global environmental damage as the profit margin of car producers already reduces total 
output. This incentive is now offset by the tax raising revenue incentive of each government. 
The side effects are an overinvestment in fuel economy by car producers and a total output 
that is too low. The welfare losses of strategic behavior by governments are significant and 
                                                 
13 These results are comparable to the assumptions on price markup in Austin and Dinan (2005) and the price elasticity of 
VMT in Parry and Small (2005). 
14 Comparable to the industry average of 4% in 2012 (European Commission, 2012). 
15 Note that the absolute total welfare is not relevant for the comparison of scenarios as it is mainly consumer surplus that 
depends on the curvature of the willingness to pay for cars. 
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amount to 2.43 bln € (1.20+1.23) each year if only the fuel tax is implemented. When both 
instruments can be used, the high tax disappears but there remains an important welfare loss 
of 2.88 bln €.   
Table 3. Benchmark results (with 8 car producers, equally divided over the two regions). 
 
Finally, we turn to the incentives for the non-cooperative governments to select one particular 
instrument. In Table 3 we reported results for the case where both governments always 
selected the same instrument, but can this be a non-cooperative equilibrium? We check this in 
Table 4 where we analyze the domestic welfares in the non-cooperative equilibrium for all 
possible combinations of instruments.  We start with the diagonal cases where both countries 
use the same type of instruments non-cooperatively. As countries are identical, their domestic 
welfare is the same when they use the same instrument and, as in Table 3, the emission 
standard performs better than the fuel tax and then the mix of instruments.  
Consider now the case where both countries use only emission standards, this is the 
instrument mix that produces the highest global welfare in the non-cooperative case. Will 
countries have in incentive to deviate from this equilibrium by using other instruments? 
Consider country 1, we see that it can improve domestic welfare by also using a fuel tax. 
Comparing cell (1,1) with cell (3,1), country 1 improves domestic welfare from 171.3 to 
172.3, but country 2 loses in this operation as it moves from 171.3 to 167.1. The result will be 
that country 2 will also implement a fuel tax and end up in cell (3,2) where it only uses a fuel 
  
  
No 
Policy 
Cooperation No Cooperation 
 Fuel Tax 
Emission 
standard 
Both 
Fuel 
Tax 
Emission 
standard 
Taxes (€cents/l) 0  9.2 0 0.37 33.5 0 
Emission standard 0  
 
3.70% 3.58% 
 
3.70% 
Firm choice of x 3.20%  3.89% 3.37% 5.29% 5.13% 3.37% 
Final fuel 
economy 
3.20%  3.89% 3.70% 5.29% 5.13% 3.70% 
total sales per 
country 
6.1  5.92 6.08 5.47 5.53 6.08 
price of driving (€) 29,255  30,782 29,225 35,315 34,745 29,225 
Δ Welfare (Bln €) 0  1.20 0.68 -1.90 -1.23 0.68 
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tax. The equilibrium in terms of choice of instruments will, in this case be, that both countries 
only use a fuel tax: a country cannot improve its pay-off by adding a fuel standard.  
Of course, if countries can agree to use only one instrument, a fuel standard would be a better 
non-cooperative equilibrium. But as illustrated in Table 4, every country is strongly tempted 
to also use fuel taxes making an agreement on the mix of instruments difficult.  
Table 4. Yearly domestic welfare (bln €) of both countries, for different mixes of non-
cooperative policies  .  
 
 
Country 2 
   Emission Standard Fuel tax Both instruments 
Country 1 
Emission 
standard 
   171.3  
               171.3 
168.3  
                 173.5 
167.1 
                   172.3 
Fuel tax 
  173.5  
               168.3 
 170.3  
              170.3 
170.4 
                   170.1 
 Both instruments 
  172.3 
                   167.1 
170.1 
              170.4 
170 
                   170 
 
In terms of overall welfare, the fuel tax non-cooperative equilibrium does better than the non-
cooperative equilibrium where both instruments are used. But the fuel tax equilibrium does 
even worse than the no-policy equilibrium.  
We summarize this result in our proposition 4: 
PROP 4 In a symmetrical non-cooperative equilibrium, individual countries will always 
prefer a fuel tax instrument as this allows to tax the profits of foreign producers.  
 
4.2. Market concentration, R&D spillovers and the pre-tax price of gas  
So far, we have assumed a fixed pretax price of gas, eight car producers and no R&D 
spillovers between those car producers. In this section, we analyze the effect of each of these 
parameters on instrument efficiency (taxes vs. standards) and their effect on the incentive to 
opt for a particular instrument mix in a non-cooperative setting. We focus mainly on the 
general welfare effects and maintain the assumption of symmetric countries. 
4.2.1. Market concentration 
In the analytical section, we have already discussed the role of competition in the car market 
for instrument efficiency. In this section, we show numerically that an increase in the number 
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of car producers improves the efficiency of tax instruments. In figure 2, we plot total welfare 
for different numbers of car producers for each country
16
. We see that in both the cooperative 
case (left part of Figure 2) and the non-cooperative case (right part of Figure 2), the emission 
standard generates less welfare than the fuel tax or policy mix. The reason is straightforward: 
with more competition, the profit margin of each car producer is lower, which means that 
more cars will be sold and that the motive of profit-taxation of foreign profits largely 
disappears. Lower car prices result in more environmental pollution damage which can be 
handled most easily via a fuel tax. In addition, we find that more market competition also 
results in higher fuel economy investments by the car producers. As a result, the emission 
standard in the policy mix becomes a redundant instrument.
17
 
Figure 2 Total Welfare in the cooperative (Left) and non-cooperative (Right) equilibrium for 
different numbers of firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can also compare the (non)-cooperative strategies of both governments. With more car 
producers entering the market, all policy measures converge to the same level: the fuel tax 
levels in the cooperative and non-cooperative case are similar for a high level of market 
competition. Governments can no longer gain in tax income by unilaterally setting the fuel 
tax equal to local marginal damage (equation 3.17) as the fuel tax in the cooperative level can 
even be higher when global damage is taken into account and the larger number of firms 
                                                 
16 In the Cournot equilibrium, an increase of car producers corresponds to an increase in competition among producers. We 
could do the same exercise for the differentiated Bertrand equilibrium by varying the level of product differentiation between 
cars.  
17 In this case, no spillovers in R&D investments have been imposed. 
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decreases the monopolistic distortion. In a market with strong competition, the fuel tax serves 
purely environmental purposes while with less competition, a high fuel tax is driven by 
strategic incentives of the government. This result only holds for the symmetric case. We 
summarize our findings in proposition 5. 
PROP 5 When the number of firms increases and in the absence of R&D spill-overs, the 
fuel tax approaches the marginal damage cost, in the non-cooperative equilibrium only 
the local damage is taken into account.  
4.2.2. R&D Spillovers 
The introduction of R&D spill overs is an important factor for the analysis of instrument 
efficiency as the need for a binding emission standard depends heavily on the spill-over rate. 
For a high R&D spill-over rate, car producers have a lower incentive to invest in fuel 
economy because their efforts also spill over to their competitors. We analyze the six 
different policy options for different spill-over rates of fuel economy.  Table 5 shows the 
results for spillovers rates that vary between 0 and 20%. 
In any policy scenario, the introduction of R&D spillovers generates large welfare 
improvements compared to the benchmark case. However, part of this welfare increase 
should be attributed to economies of scale in the R&D market as we assume a fixed cost for 
each car producer for all investments in fuel economy. By not allowing car producers to 
collaborate in R&D, the spillovers that we introduce also represent welfare gains that would 
be incorporated by car producers if cooperation in R&D is modelled endogenously. 
Nevertheless, the net effect of spillovers in R&D on welfare is positive regardless of the 
cooperation level between car producers. 
When  we compare the different policy instruments in the cooperative equilibrium, we see 
that the fuel tax is a very inefficient instrument to correct for increasing R&D spillovers. The 
only way a fuel tax can generate  more efforts in fuel economy is by setting the fuel tax 
inefficiently high and thus reducing market output more than necessary. In contrast, an 
emission standard is more efficient to stimulate R&D efforts. Even for small spillovers 
(10%), the emission standard is now binding for the car producers and thus governments set 
the fuel economy level. The introduction of R&D spill overs demonstrates that, whenever 
there is a need to correct for more than one externality, two instruments perform better than 
one.  
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Table 5. Fuel taxes, emissions standards, final fuel economy and welfare for different spill 
over rates and different instrument choices (with 4 car producers per country). 
 
 
 
.  
  
 
 
0 10% 20% 
Cooperative Fuel tax 
   
Taxes (€cents/l) 9.2 21 31.4 
company efforts in fuel economy 3.89% 4.12% 4.18% 
final fuel economy 3.89% 7.01% 10.00% 
Welfare (bln€)-BEST 0 -1.37 -9.19 
Cooperative Policy mix (=BEST)       
Taxes (€cents/l) 10.8 6.7 0 
Emission standard 3.65% 6.34% 9.28% 
company efforts in fuel economy 3.98% 6.34% 9.28% 
final fuel economy 3.98% 10.78% 22.27% 
Welfare (bln €) = BEST 342.88 351.1 364.40 
Cooperative Emission Standard       
Emission standard 3.70% 6.41% 9.28% 
company efforts in fuel economy 3.98% 6.41% 9.28% 
final fuel economy 3.98% 10.9% 22.8% 
Welfare (bln€)-BEST -0.3 -0.06 0 
Non-cooperative fuel tax       
Taxes (€cents/l) 33.5 39.7 45.7 
company efforts in fuel economy 5.12% 4.98% 4.76% 
final fuel economy 5.12%  8.46% 11.40% 
Welfare (bln €)-BEST -2.22 -3.28 -9.93 
Non-cooperative policy mix       
Taxes (€cents/l) 37 37 37 
Emission standard 3.58% 6.23% 9.11% 
company efforts in fuel economy 3.98% 6.23% 9.11% 
final fuel economy 3.98% 10.59% 21.86% 
Welfare (bln €)-BEST -2.58 -2.25 -2.75 
Non-cooperative emission standard       
Emission standard 3.70% 6.41% 9.28% 
company efforts in fuel economy 3.98% 6.41% 9.28% 
final fuel economy 3.98% 10.9% 22.8% 
Welfare (bln €)-BEST 0 -0.06 0 
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In the policy mix, governments set a binding emission standard and a lower fuel tax. With 
increased efforts in fuel economy, a lower level of remaining CO2 emissions requires less 
intervention in the output market. The profit margin of the car producer can already increase 
the cost of driving sufficiently to correct for the remaining environmental damage. The net 
result is that for increasing spillovers, the optimal policy requires a stricter standard and a 
lower fuel tax. 
As in the benchmark, governments always have the incentive to deviate to a non-cooperative 
fuel tax policy, regardless of the policy choice of other countriesThis is demonstrated in 
Table 6, for a spillover rate of 10%.  In contrast with the non-cooperative  benchmark case in 
Table 4, the policy in which only a fuel tax is imposed no longer dominates the policy in 
which both instruments are combined. If one country sets a binding emission constraint, the 
other government will no longer affect the fuel economy of any car by its fuel tax. The fuel 
tax will only be used to extract foreign profits. Therefore, equation (3.20) can be simplified to 
(3.17). The best reaction is to set the fuel tax equal to local damage.  
Table 6. Yearly domestic fuel welfare (bln €) of both countries, for different policy choices of 
each government and a spillover rate of 10 %. 
 
 
Country 2 
 
  
Emission 
Standard 
Fuel tax Policy mix 
Country 1 
Emission 
standard 
175.5  
                175.5 
172.5  
              177.5                 
177.5 
172.5 
              177.5 
Fuel tax 
177.5  
                172.5 
173 
          173 
174.4 
               174.2     
174  Policy mix 
177.5 
                  172.5 
174.2 
               174.4 
 174.5 
                174.5 
 
In a non-cooperative equilibrium, governments will always set a fuel tax to extract profits of 
foreign car producers. However, if spill overs in R&D are high enough, they will combine the 
fuel tax with a strict emission standard. This reduces the strategic incentives that drive up the 
fuel tax and improves welfare compared to a single policy.  
This result can be summarized in the following proposition. 
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PROP 6 In a symmetric equilibrium, the higher the rate of R&D spillovers, the more 
important the fuel efficiency standard becomes. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, the 
fuel efficiency standard is still accompanied by a fuel tax. 
4.2.3. Crude oil price 
Another exogenous parameter we consider in the model is the price of crude oil which 
determines the pre-tax price of gasoline. We vary the pretax price of gasoline per litre from 
0.2€ to 1€. It is straightforward that higher fuel prices will always lead to lower welfare. 
Therefore, we analyze the effect of oil prices on the optimal policy directly.  
First, we find that the fuel economy of a car is always positively influenced by the oil price, 
either by a stricter emission standard of governments or by more efforts of the car producers 
in case of a non-binding standard. However, as long as R&D spillovers are absent, producers 
increase their R&D investments more than is desired by both governments. Therefore, 
increasing fuel prices result in less binding emission standards by the government. 
Second, we can analyze the effect on the fuel tax. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, the fuel 
tax is hardly affected by the crude oil price. Under the assumption of symmetric countries, 
the fuel tax does not depend on the profit margin of the firms, but is only affected by the local 
environmental damage; as the marginal damage per liter is constant, the environmental 
damage is not affected by the fuel tax. For the cooperative equilibrium, the optimal fuel tax is 
represented in Figure 3 in function of fuel prices. In contrast to the intuition, a higher crude 
oil price increases the optimal fuel tax, both as a single policy instrument and in the policy 
mix. However, if the tax instrument is used as a single policy, the increase only occurs for 
very high oil prices. The explanation for this result is given by (3.10) and (3.13). In the case 
of a policy mix, the fuel tax is driven by the profit margin of the firms (LHS) and the 
environmental damage (RHS). For a higher crude oil price, the environmental damage of 
driving is not affected, but the profit margin is lower as producers incorporate the higher 
crude oil price in their car price policy. Therefore, the profit margin no longer incorporates 
the same amount of remaining environmental damage. The argumentation is similar to the 
previous analysis of more market competition: a lower profit margin requires a higher fuel 
tax to correct for environmental damage. If the fuel tax is applied as a single instrument, the 
same argument applies but is compensated by its effect on investments in fuel economy. High 
oil prices and fuel taxation lead to over-investment in fuel economy. The resulting fuel tax 
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will depend on the net effect of the two incentives. In this example, governments will reduce 
over-investments by setting a lower fuel tax as long as pre-tax price of fuel is below 
0.8€/liter. For higher oil prices, the marginal effect on fuel economy is very limited and 
governments focus on the lower profit margin which results in a higher fuel tax. 
Figure 3. optimal fuel taxes in the cooperative equilibrium 
 
4.3. Asymmetric policy choices 
In a symmetric environment, where each government is confronted with the same market 
characteristics and environmental damage, the final choice of policy instruments will always 
be equal across countries. In this section we relax the assumption of perfect symmetry. We 
study two specific cases. First, we assume that all damage created by CO2 emissions is 
incurred by one country only, while the other country only cares about the other external 
costs of driving. We refer to a situation in which the costs of global warming are divided 
unequally over the different countries. Second, we assume that all car producers are located 
in one country, while the other country has no car industry
18
. 
We focus on these cases for two specific reasons. First, we do not change the total damage 
for  both countries. As a result, cooperation between governments will always result in the 
same outcome as before. The only differences in policy choices can be found in the non-
cooperative equilibrium. Therefore, we can compare the results with the benchmark in Table 
4. A second reason is that these cases allow us to illustrate the difference between 
environmental policy as a measure to reduce environmental damage or to strategically 
influence welfare levels between countries.   
                                                 
18 In our model, we use the profits of the car producers to measure the importance of the car industry for each government 
where we assume that this profit is returned to national shareholders. If governments only care about the presence of car 
production rather then profits, this results in exactly the same outcome as long as profits are related to total car production. 
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4.3.1. Environmental damage 
In the benchmark case, we assumed that each government faces a constant marginal damage 
of CO2 emissions equal to 0.12 €/l. In this scenario, we assume that the total marginal costs 
(0.24€/l) are incurred by one country, while the other country has no damage associated to 
CO2 emissions. All other model parameters are equal to the benchmark in section 4.2. We 
calculate the impact on welfare of each country for a given instrument choice of both 
governments. Results are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. Yearly domestic welfare (bln €) of both countries, for different strategic policy 
choices where country 1 faces all environmental pollution damage. 
 
 
Country 2 (without pollution damage) 
 
  
Emission 
Standard 
Fuel tax Policy mix 
Country 1  
(with pollution 
damage) 
Emission 
standard 
143.3 
                199.0 
141.8 
              200.3                 
177.5 
141.8 
              200.3 
Fuel tax 
147.2  
                192.8 
146.2 
           194 
146.2 
               194 
Policy mix 
147.2 
                   192.8 
146.2 
                 194 
 146.2 
                194 
 
Compared to the benchmark case in section 4.1, we see that both governments are indifferent 
between two options: they can either set a fuel tax or an emission standard combined with the 
fuel tax. Any emission standard imposed will not influence the final fuel economy of the car 
as the R&D investments are only driven by the oil price and fuel taxes. The level of the fuel 
tax, however, differs among countries: only the country that faces damage from CO2 
emissions will incorporate this damage in the fuel tax. Interestingly, the asymmetric damage 
does not affect total welfare in the non-cooperative equilibrium. The aggregated tax burden of 
both governments is approximately the same as in the benchmark, which is reflected in the 
same fuel economy level as before (3.30%). 
 
4.3.2. Strength of domestic car producers 
We assume now that all car producers are located in country 1.  
The results are only in one way similar to the case of asymmetric environmental pollution: 
Country 1 acts as an ‘environmental leader’ and sets both a high fuel tax and emission 
standard, while country 2 hardly imposes taxes or an emission standard. However, the 
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incentives to conduct these environmental policies are driven by strategic trade policies rather 
than bt environmental concerns.  
Countries without a strong car industry (country 1) have two incentives to set an 
environmental policy: to reduce global emissions and to redirect foreign profits to their own 
country. In this case, governments will set an emission standard that improves fuel economy 
with 12%, which is much higher than is socially optimal as they do not face the cost of 
investing in R&D for fuel economy
19
. The remainder of the profits of car producers are taxed 
away with a high fuel tax. The country that has a strong car industry (country 2) has no 
interest in setting any environmental policy at all as it tries to protect their car industry and 
the policy of the other government already reduces pollution damage. In contrast with the 
previous case, we find a very significant impact on welfare. Global welfare decreases by 
approximately 10% in comparison to the benchmark with an equal number of car producers 
in each country due to high emission standards. 
Table 8. Yearly domestic fuel welfare (bln €) of both countries, for different strategic policy 
choices of each government and when car producers are located in country 2. 
 
 
Country 1 (no car producers) 
 
  
Emission 
Standard 
Fuel tax Policy mix 
Country 2  
(car producers) 
Any policy 
167 
              142 
192 
               146                 
162 
      148 
4.3.3. Model application 
The two asymmetric cases that we discuss demonstrate in a simplistic setting the interaction 
between environmental concerns and trade incentives that influence the government’s 
decision to choose environmental policy instruments. The results are straightforward. Using 
the environmental policy as a trade instruments significantly decreases welfare. Cooperation 
between governments can reduce these trade incentives but is not likely to occur as all 
governments always deviate from the cooperative equilibrium to increase their own welfare. 
Furthermore, asymmetric concerns on global pollution damage do not affect the global 
welfare as the environmental policy instruments are used to reduce this pollution. With 
                                                 
19 If we allow for an endogenous number of car producers, the government without car producers will set an emission 
standard that is even higher in order to reduce total car producers on the market. As a result, this will even reduce welfare 
further and only reinforces our analysis. 
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asymmetric trade incentives however, the governments will rely much more on 
environmental policy to extract market rents which reduces global welfare. 
In order to keep the analysis of the model clear, we focused on specific cases where we 
allowed only limited parameter changes. We did not discuss the interactions between the 
several cases that can occur. For example, if we allow for spillovers in R&D, the policy 
choices for both asymmetric cases change significantly. For asymmetric environmental 
pollution levels, we will have one country that sets a strict emission standard while both fuel 
tax levels will be low. For an asymmetric car industry, we even find that no fuel taxes will be 
imposed at all. Furthermore, we could allow for a combination of asymmetric pollution and a 
difference in car industry, which would result in a fuel tax in 1 country and an emission tax in 
the other. However, for each of these scenarios the underlying incentives for each 
government are analogous to the cases that we discussed and the net result in environmental 
policy will be an aggregation of the different elements analyzed in both the analytical model 
and the numerical exercise. 
5. Conclusion  
In the car market, non-cooperative policies to reduce CO2 emissions have led to the 
implementation of policy instruments that differ among countries. Emission reduction is 
targeted using a wide range of policy instruments. This has led to a very heterogeneous mix 
of policy instruments between governments. In this paper, we analyze the welfare effects of 
combining policy instruments in the international car market to reduce carbon emissions. Our 
model is a variant of the Ulph and Ulph (2007) model and is kept simple. We focus on two 
questions. First, we look into the effect of cooperative and non-cooperative policies on the 
instrument choice for reducing CO2 emissions in the car market. We analyze the role of fuel 
prices, market concentration and R&D spillovers on instrument choice. Second, we analyze 
how governments with a similar car market but different country characteristics opt for a 
different environmental policy instrument in a non-cooperative setting. We allow for 
differences in environmental damage and strength of domestic car producers in the car 
market.  
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First, the analytical model shows that governments have no incentive to coordinate their 
environmental policy within the car market. Each government will always try to use its policy 
instruments to combine the reduction of CO2 emissions with the protection of domestic 
producers and consumers, either by safeguarding their direct market surplus or by taxing 
foreign profits in order to raise government revenue. Particularly when global environmental 
damage is low, non-cooperative governments may opt for too high fuel taxes in order to tax 
foreign profits. This may then generate too high fuel efficiency efforts from producers. The 
fuel efficiency standard becomes a more important instrument when there is only a small 
number of producers, when there is a higher spill over rate and when crude oil prices are 
lower. Countries that mainly import cars use strict fuel efficiency policies and high fuel taxes 
while car exporting countries do not use fuel effiency policies and set low fuel tax rates. 
Both the analytical model and the numerical example demonstrate how market environments, 
producer decisions and country characteristics determine the final decision of governments to 
conduct environmental policy in the car market and how these policies interact with each 
other. The insights of this model can be used to analyse questions like how governments react 
if one country decides to change its policy mix,  what is the effect of encouraging cooperation 
(spillovers) in research and development? how will a higher fuel price impact the choice and 
level of different policy instruments? and to what extent is the observed environmental policy 
of a government the result of trade incentives or environmental concerns?  
The model can be adapted in many more ways. For any number of countries and car 
producers, we can allow for differences in size, R&D policies, market concentration and 
domestic car production, pre-tax fuel prices and production costs or other market 
characteristics. Each of these elements will affect the instrument choice of governments and 
therefore also the strategic game between different governments and its effects on welfare in 
all countries.  
In order to complete this paper with an empirical analysis of currently observed policies, 
several limitations still need to be addressed. First, we have assumed that fixed costs of R&D 
cannot be shared among car producers. But, car producers might cooperate on the level of 
research and development, which results in the internalization of spillovers by each car 
producer. Further research is necessary to fully understand the interaction between 
cooperative R&D and the choice of environmental policy instruments. Second, our 
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interpretation of the strategic decisions of car producers can incorporate elements of the 
traditional literature on econometric car market models. Although these studies find an effect 
of environmental policy on producer decisions which is similar to ours, the incorporation of 
product differentiation and other car characteristics can provide a more accurate estimation of 
the numerical effects of the strategic policy game between governments.  
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Appendix A 
We derive the output levels in the Cournot equilibrium. The profit function of each firm is 
given by equation (3.5): 
    
   
    [  (∑    
 
   
)     ]                          
We derive the profit function of company 1 in country 1with respect to output level     for a 
given level of output for each competitor in that country. We know that the market prices is 
given by (3.1) and the fuel cost     is fixed. In the equilibrium, this first order condition will 
equal zero. 
 
    
    
 [   (∑   
 
   
)      ]             
We can derive the first order condition for each firm. The Cournot equilibrium is given by 
solving the system of n first order conditions for the n output levels: 
{
  
 
  
 
                                       
                                       
 
  (                         )               
 
Solving the system of equations, we find a solution for     in function of costs and demand 
parameters: 
    
  ∑             
      
          
Generalizing the result, we get the definition of output as given by equation (3.6): 
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Appendix B 
We derive the first order condition that determines the optimal fuel economy level for each 
firm. The profit firm to be maximized is given by the profit margin on each car minus the 
costs of R&D for fuel economy. 
      
   ∑[(      )          ]
 
    
   
From the derivation of the first order condition in the third stage (see appendix A), we know 
that the profit margin of the producer on every car equals to  
                 
This results in the simplified profit function as presented in equation (3.7): 
      
  ∑    
 
 
     
             ̅          
We know that the output is affected by the fuel cost, both of the own car (   ) the of the 
competitors’ car (   ), that both depend on fuel economy   . The first order condition equals 
Using definition (3.6) for the output level and equation (3.2) and (3.3) for the fuel cost of 
each car, we can derive the output with respect to the fuel cost and the fuel cost with respect 
to fuel economy. The latter is given by 
{
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We can know easily compute the first order condition with respect to fuel economy x as 
given by equation (3.8). 
 ∑ (
        
   
) (     )      
 
 
     
 
Appendix C 
To understand the welfare implications of cooperative and non-cooperative policy, we need 
to derive explicit solutions for the fuel tax and emission standard. In this appendix, we 
assume that the emission standard is always binding. The same analysis applies for a non-
binding standard. First we will show that total welfare is always higher in a cooperative 
equilibrium compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium. Next, we show that each 
government has an incentive to deviate from this cooperative equilibrium. 
We solve the first order conditions for both emission standard x and fuel tax t. for the 
cooperative  equilibrium (C), we have that 
  
                   (     (          )) 
 (                  )
 
  
                       
              
 
The welfare in equilibrium is given by 
          
                   
               
 
The welfare is positive as longs as we have an interior solution            . We can do 
the same analysis for the non-cooperative equilibrium (NC) and have 
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By use of the definitions of taxes, emission standards and output, we can show that the 
difference in welfare is always positive 
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